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THE PHYSICIAN LABOR MARKET IN A MANAGED 
CARE-DOMINATED ENVIRONMENT 
RICHARD A. HlRTH and MICHAEL E. CHERNEW* 
The belief that doctors respond to declining demand by treating patients more 
aggressively has created skepticism about relying on market forces to restructure 
physician supply. We argue that even if the physician labor market is dysfunctional 
under fee-for-service incentives, it can perform better as managed care becomes 
dominant. Our model implies a nonlinear effect of managed care penetration on 
incomes. Physicians can offset most or all of initial declines in demand, but cannot 
insulate themselves indefinitely. This may explain the observation that, until re- 
cently, the growth of managed care has not been accompanied by large physician 
income changes. (&L I 1 1 ,- 53 1) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs) 
and other managed care arrangements are rap- 
idly growing alternatives to fee-for-service 
(FFS) insurance in the United States, HMO 
enrollment has grown from under 3 million in 
1970 (Interstudy [1986]) to over 46 million 
by early 1995 (Interstudy [1995]). Little is 
known about how these changes in health care 
financing will ultimately affect physicians’ in- 
comes, but managed care is undoubtedly al- 
tering the economic environment of medical 
practice. The shift from FFS to salaried or 
capitated payment reduces physicians’ incen- 
tives to overtreat.’ Further, managed care 
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1. Physicians in group and staff model HMOs are usu- 
ally salaried. Physicians in other types of managed care 
plans, such as  independent practice associations or pre- 
ferred provider organizations, are paid either at a dis- 
counted FFS rate or by capitation (a fixed payment per 
patient per month independent of services actually per- 
formed). Although the effects of managed care on the de- 
mand for physician services may depend on the mix of 
managed care plans, this paper uses the generic terms 
“ H M O  and “managed care” for ease of exposition. 
plans control physicians’ access to their en- 
rollees by monitoring practice patterns and re- 
moving overly aggressive doctors from their 
panels. HMOs also employ a different physi- 
cian mix (with fewer specialists) than the mix 
that characterizes the FFS environment. Thus, 
a hypothesized consequence of rising HMO 
market share is reduced demand for special- 
ists. Wennberg et al. [1993] estimate potential 
surpluses ranging from 10% for emergency 
medicine to 2 10% in pathology. 
Surpluses of these magnitudes would be 
expected to reduce earnings. However, until 
recently, physicians have enjoyed stable or 
rising incomes (Simon and Born [1996]). This 
may be explained by asymmetric information 
between patients and physicians: if patients 
are poorly informed about the effectiveness of 
treatment options, doctors may be able to pro- 
tect their incomes from the loss of patients to 
managed care by prescribing more aggressive 
treatment to their remaining FFS patients. De- 
spite mixed evidence on the extent of sup- 
plier-induced demand (SID) (e.g., Fuchs 
[ 19781, Newhouse et al. [ 19821, Dranove and 
Wehner [1994],  Rizzo and Blumenthal  
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The proponents of quotas for the size and 
mix of the health workforce argue that 
the supply side of the health sector is 
simply impervious to signals from the de- 
mand side ... [I]t is widely believed that 
... physicians enjoy almost total discretion 
in dictating the volume and composition 
of health care they render ... allow[ing] 
physicians to extract very high “target in- 
comes” virtually regardless of the local 
physician-to-population ratio. (Reinhardt 
[ 19941) 
Interest in physician incomes arises in part 
from the central role that incomes play in 
sending appropriate signals about changing 
supply and demand conditions. If FFS physi- 
cians can maintain their incomes as the FFS 
patient pool shrinks, decisions about spe- 
cialty, location, and HMOs’ staffing patterns 
would have little reason to change. Alterna- 
tively, if FFS incomes are sensitive to man- 
aged care penetration, we would expect doc- 
tors to increasingly practice in areas and spe- 
cialties in which employment opportunities 
have become relatively favorable, pursue non- 
clinical positions, or retire. Likewise, HMOs 
would reduce substitution towards non-physi- 
cian providers and away from specialist phy- 
sicians. 
The consensus among health workforce ex- 
perts is that the U.S. has too many physicians 
and too many specialists relative to primary 
care physicians and that market adjustments 
will be insufficient to restructure the physi- 
cian supply. Thus, many health workforce ex- 
perts and medical organizations have called 
for centralized workforce planning (e.g., 
Mitka [1997]), Committee on the U.S. Physi- 
cian Supply [1996], Pew [1995], Cohen and 
Todd [ 19941, Schroeder [ 19941, Wennberg et 
al. [1993]). Proposals include limits on the 
number and specialty composition of resi- 
dency positions, restrictions on medical 
school class sizes and immigration by inter- 
national medical graduates, and incentive pay- 
ments for early retirement, retraining, or di- 
version of physicians into non-clinical posi- 
tions. 
Before advocating interventions in the 
medical labor market, it is worth exploring the 
potential for market forces to generate the de- 
sired physician supply changes. Many sup- 
porters of workforce policies presume that the 
failures of a FFS-dominated physician ser- 
vices market would persist even in a radically 
different context. Ironically, the resurgence of 
interest in physician workforce planning co- 
incides with changes in the medical market- 
place that may force the physician labor mar- 
ket far closer to a competitive outcome even 
without intervention. The purpose of this 
paper is not to assess whether or not this mar- 
ket has failed in the past. Rather, we will 
argue that even if the physician labor market 
is quite dysfunctional under FFS incentives, 
it may perform better if managed care be- 
comes dominant. 
We posit that the primary mechanism 
through which managed care affects FFS phy- 
sicians is a declining FFS patient per physi- 
cian ratio. Thus, the model developed here ex- 
plores how FFS physicians respond to the loss 
of patients. The main implication is that the 
effect of managed care penetration on FFS 
physician incomes becomes stronger as mar- 
ket share rises. By increasing service inten- 
sity, physicians may offset most or all of the 
effects of initial declines in  practice size, but 
they cannot indefinitely insulate themselves 
from market forces. 
This non-linear effect of HMO penetration 
on FFS earnings provides a rationale for the 
puzzling stylized fact that for years the growth 
of managed care did not reduce physician in- 
comes or narrow the earnings gap between 
primary care and specialty medicine. Further, 
such a non-linear effect suggests that the phy- 
sician labor market will respond strongly to 
the continued growth of managed care, reduc- 
ing the need for costly workforce planning 
measures. Physicians’ ability to induce de- 
mand for their services has remained a con- 
tentious issue in health economics for decades 
(e.g., Rizzo and Blumenthal [1996] and ac- 
companying commentaries). In a small way, 
our model helps bridge this dichotomy of 
opinion by showing how declines in FFS prac- 
tice size eventually affect incomes regardless 
of attempts to induce demand. 
II. SUPPLIER-INDUCED DEMAND 
In standard economic theory, firms move 
down their supply curves if the exogenously 
set price of a service falls. Likewise, an ex- 
pansion of supply causes equilibrium price to 
fall. These predictions have not always been 
verified in the physician services market. For 
example, Fuchs [1978] and Cromwell and 
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Mitchell [1986] find that an increase in the 
supply of surgeons leads to both higher utili- 
zation of surgical procedures and higher 
prices. Likewise, Rizzo and Blumenthal 
[ 19961 show that physicians earning less than 
their “target” incomes charge higher prices. 
One explanation for such paradoxical re- 
sults is the target income hypothesis (TIH). 
Under the TIH, physician-firms pursue a “tar- 
get income” defined by historical income lev- 
els or incomes earned by other professionals 
rather than maximizing profits. Physicians 
facing a fee decrease or greater competition 
attempt to attain their target incomes by shift- 
ing out patients’ demand for their services. 
Although the TIH has sometimes been consid- 
ered to be at odds with utility maximization 
(Evans [ 1974]), it can be reconciled with util- 
ity maximization by making several strong as- 
sumptions about the utility function (Formby 
and Millner [ 19851). 
McGuire and Pauly [ 199 11 (MP) analyze a 
physician’s response to a fee reduction in a 
model that encompasses both profit maximi- 
zation and income targeting behavior. The 
change in demand inducement in response to 
a fee reduction depends on the physician’s 
marginal utility of income. Consider two ex- 
treme cases. First, with no income effects 
(constant marginal utility of income with ad- 
ditively separable utility), physicians maxi- 
mize profits net of the value of foregone lei- 
sure and any disutility of inducing demand. 
Quantity of services and incomes unambigu- 
ously decline as physicians move down their 
supply curves. Although physicians may be 
inducing demand, they do not respond to a fee 
reduction by raising service intensity further. 
At the other extreme is the target income hy- 
pothesis, which arises when the marginal util- 
ity of income is very high below the target 
and very low above the target. This compels 
physicians to offset a fee reduction by pre- 
scribing enough additional services to main- 
tain their incomes. 
In intermediate cases, quantity could either 
rise or fall in response to a fee cut. If income 
effects are strong enough, physicians will in- 
duce more demand when fees fall. However, 
increased service intensity offsets only a por- 
tion of the effect of lower fees on physician 
incomes. Inducement is limited by the in- 
creasing marginal disutilities of labor and in- 
ducement. 
Dranove [ 19881 models demand induce- 
ment differently, showing that if physicians 
develop reputations for the “aggressiveness” 
of their practice styles, demand inducement 
can be limited by patients’ refusal to consent 
to treatment. Rochaix [ 19891 derives similar 
results using second opinions as the mecha- 
nism limiting physicians’ ability to over- 
prescribe. 
Ill. A MODEL OF THE EFFECTS OF 
DECLINING FFS PRACTICE SIZE 
Our model builds upon the McGuire and 
Pauly [ 19911 model because it encompasses 
profit maximization and the TIH. The TIH 
case is useful because it  demonstrates how 
economic pressures affect FFS physicians 
even if the physician labor market is very dys- 
functional. We employ Dranove’s [ 19881 and 
Rochaix’s [ 19891 insights about patient be- 
havior to analyze the effect of a decline in 
fee-for-service practice sizes. Since HMOs 
generally use fewer physicians per enrollee 
than the FFS sector, we hypothesize that de- 
creasing the FFS patient to physician ratio is 
the primary mechanism through which the 
growth of managed care affects FFS physi- 
c ians. 
Model of Physician Behavior 
Physician utility is a function of profit from 
medical practice ( x ) ,  leisure ( L )  and induce- 
ment effort (I): U(x, L, I ) .3  Assumptions are 
analogous to those in MP. Utility increases in 
income (U,  > 0) and leisure ( U ,  > 0) and de- 
creases in inducement (U, < 0; physicians 
incur a psychic cost when violating the 
agency relationship by recommending ser- 
vices a fully informed patient would not de- 
mand). Marginal utilities of income and lei- 
sure are decreasing and marginal disutility of 
inducing demand is increasing (Un, < 0, 
U,, < 0, U,, < 0). To keep the model tractable, 
the cross partials are assumed to be zero 
(UnL = 0, U,, = 0, U,, = 0). We also consider 
2. The model describes the effects of any change that 
alters the physician to patient ratio, but we believe it is 
natural to use it to analyze the impact of managed care. 
Section IV sketches a model with endogenous HMO market 
share. 
3. In this section, we are only modeling physicians who 
exclusively treat fee-for-service patients. Below, we will 
also model the choice of whether or not to see HMO pa- 
tients. 
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the special case in which physicians experi- 
ence no disutility from inducing demand 
As physicians raise inducement, the quan- 
t i ty of services  per patient [X(I)]  rises 
[XAI) > 01. Define inducement effort such that 
XIXI) I0 (as inducement effort rises, the quan- 
tity of services to which a patient consents 
rises at a non-increasing rate).4 
McGuire and Pauly [ 19911 assume a fixed 
practice size. That is, high inducement effort 
does not drive away patients and physicians 
cannot steal patients away from aggressive in- 
ducers. In the context of the growth of man- 
aged care, the dwindling number of patients 
per fee-for-service physician is a crucial con- 
sideration. Thus, we employ the idea devel- 
oped by Dranove and Rochaix that patients 
leave physicians whom they believe to be 
overly aggressive as the basis for relaxing this 
assumption. We hypothesize that the number 
of patients is a decreasing function of induce- 
ment effort. As I increases, more patients seek 
care elsewhere because they believe that their 
physician is acting as a poor agent. Denote the 
number of patients in a physician’s practice 
by n(l;N), where N represents a patient popu- 
lation shift parameter which is not under the 
control of any individual doctor. N can be 
thought of as the average FFS practice size. 
As this ratio declines, each physician loses 
some patients (nN> O).5 The number of pa- 
tients in a physician’s practice decreases at an 
increas ing  ra te  in inducement  effor t  
[nXI;N) < 0 and n,,(/;N) < 01. That is, patients 
become increasingly resistant as physicians 
recommend more aggressive treatment. 
The cross partial derivative, nlN, is ambig- 
uous in sign and reflects the selection of pa- 
tients remaining in a physician’s practice as 
N falls. If patients leave the practice at the 
same rate at any N, nlN would be negative 
(larger practice size implies that a larger ab- 
solute loss of patients in response higher in- 
(u/=o). 
4. Define /=0 as the inducement level at which the phy- 
sician acts as a perfect agent for the patient (i.e., prescribes 
the amount of care the patient would choose if she were as 
well informed as the doctor). 
5. Since HMOs use fewer doctors per enrollee than the 
FFS sector, growth in the HMO market share decreases N 
as a transfer of 1 %  of patients to HMOs is accompanied by 
a transfer o f  fewer than one percent of  physicians. 
ducement). This would be plausible if the set 
of patients leaving a physician’s practice is 
random, as might be expected if the source of 
a decline in N is an increase in the supply of 
otherwise identical physicians. If the growth 
of managed care is driving the decline in N, 
patients remaining in the practice after the de- 
cline in N are likely to be different in their 
responsiveness to a change in I than those who 
left the practice. If, as it seems likely, patients 
who are first to leave for managed care are 
those most sensitive to inducement or most 
averse to aggressive practice styles, the re- 
maining patients are less likely to leave the 
physician’s practice if I is increased, making 
nlNeven more negative than if departures were 
random.6 
The quantity of services sold by a physi- 
cian choosing inducement level I is n(l;N) 
X(I). Given our assumptions on patients’ de- 
mand for a physician’s services, n(I;N),Y(I) 
will have an inverted U-shape in inducement 
effort if two boundary conditions are satisfied. 
First, a physician engaging in no inducement 
can increase quantity by recommending more 
aggressive care [XXO) > -nXO;N)]. Second, be- 
yond some point, overtreatment becomes so 
blatant that the loss of patients more than off- 
sets the greater quantity of services rendered 
to the remaining patients [3 an I above which 
XXI) < -nXI;N)]. Defining I‘ as the inducement 
effort that maximizes n(l;N)X(l), attempts to 
induce beyond this point are counterproduc- 
tive. The remainder of the paper analyzes 
physicians’ responses to the loss of patients 
when facing such a demand constraint under 
various assumptions on physician utility. 
We maintain MP’s assumption that physi- 
cians are price-takers, with fees set by third 
party payers. Thus, physicians attempting to 
maintain a target income must raise the quan- 
tity of services per patient rather than their 
fees. If the growth of managed care creates 
downward pressures on fee levels, physicians 
would have to rely even more heavily on rais- 
ing quantity in order to maintain their in- 
6. Such patient selection effects could also affect XI ,  If  
patients remaining in FFS medicine are relatively easy to 
induce (or have a relative preference for aggressive medi- 
cine), X I  may rise as  N falls. For notational convenience, 
we posit that selection effects operate only through n/N(i.e., 
x / N  = 0). 
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comes. The physician chooses a level of in- 
ducement to solve:’ 
max U(x, L, I) 
I 
(1) 
(2) subject to rt = mn(k Nyr(Z) 
(3) and L = 24 - tn(l;N)X(I) 
Equation ( 2 )  represents net practice in- 
come, with m denoting the margin between 
price and the constant costs of inputs other 
than physician time and inducement. Equation 
(3) characterizes the physician’s time con- 
straint, with t representing work per unit of 
service 
Substituting for x and L in the utility func- 
tion simplifies the physician’s problem to: 
Dropping the functions’ arguments, the 
first order condition is: 
( 5 )  (nXl + n $ ) (  U,m - ULt) + Ul = 0 
The first order condition requires that the 
marginal utility of income generated by the 
last unit of service equals the marginal disutil- 
ity of inducement and foregone leisure. The 
terms inside the first set of parentheses equal 
zero when the quantity of services, nX, is 
max imi~ed .~  If physicians induce the income 
maximizing quantity of services ( I =  r), the 
first order condition cannot hold if U,< 0. 
7. Physician disutility is based on inducement per pa- 
tient rather than on the total amount of  inducement (number 
of  patients times inducement per patient). Thus, disutility 
depends on practice style. The qualitative results would be 
similar if disutility were a function of the total amount of 
induced services. 
8. If the physician must spend time convincing patients 
to consent to aggressive treatment, inducement could be 
modeled as a direct cost, with I appearing in the time budget 
rather than as an argument in the utility function. 
9. nX/ is the number of  patients times the rate of  in- 
crease in services per patient as inducement rises. ns is 
the rate at which patients leave the inducing physician times 
the quantity of  services per patient. 
Thus, it must be the case that nXI + n&> 0 
which implies I < r. When inducing demand 
is distasteful, the physician will not induce the 
income maximizing level of demand because 
as I+I‘, the extra income generated goes to 
zero and, hence, does not generate sufficient 
additional utility to offset the marginal disutil- 
ity of raising inducement. If UI = 0, physicians 
can be at a comer solution with I = I‘. We will 
return to this case below. 
The comparative static of interest is the ef- 
fect of a change in the number of FFS patients 
per physician, a likely result of the increased 
presence of managed care, on inducement. 
The comparative static can be found by dif- 
ferentiating equation (5) and applying the im- 
plicit function theorem: 
When Z<r, n T + n &  must be positive. 
Thus, first order condition (5) can hold only 
if (U,m - ULt) > 0. Given the sign assump- 
tions, the denominator of equation (6) is neg- 
ative, satisfying the second order condition 
for maximization. 
The numerator’s sign is ambiguous. The 
first set of terms inside the brackets is nega- 
tive when I < P ,  but the second set takes on 
the ambiguous sign of (nJ1 + nlNX), which 
represents the change in the slope of the rela- 
tionship between the total quantity of services 
(nX) and inducement (I) with respect to a 
change in the patient to physician ratio 
[a(afl/aZ) /aW. If the relationship between 
nXand Isimply shifts up or down with N (i.e., 
s lope is independent o f N ) ,  then ( n f i ,  
+ n l & )  = 0 and the second set of terms van- 
ishes. In this case, I N  is negative implying that 
a decline in practice size leads physicians to 
induce more demand from their remaining pa- 
tients. 
I N  will only be positive if ( n f i I + n I r Y )  
(U,m - ULt) is positive and large enough to 
offset the negative terms. nJl is indeed pos- 
itive reflecting the greater increase in services 
generated by raising inducement effort in 
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larger practices. However, n,,&is a patient se- 
lection term that, as noted earlier, is expected 
to be negative under managed care growth. 
Even if (n&, + n,&) is positive, the compar- 
ative static can be unambiguously signed if 
the disutility of inducing demand is suffi- 
ciently low because the first order condition 
( 5 )  can hold as the marginal disutility of in- 
ducing demand approaches zero only if the 
ambiguous term (n&, + nl&)(U,m - U,t) also 
approaches zero. Thus, physicians induce 
more aggressively when facing exogenous de- 
clines in practice size under most scenarios. 
We first summarize the intuition of the 
comparative static (6) in the general case and 
then consider three special cases (income tar- 
geting, profit-maximization, and physicians 
who do not dislike inducing demand). As the 
patient to physician ratio declines, income 
and workload fall. This raises marginal utility 
of income and decreases marginal utility of 
leisure, leading physicians to want to induce 
demand more aggressively. The fall in N also 
affects physicians' ability to generate de- 
mand. nX, + n? represents marginal returns 
from inducement (slope of total services with 
respect to I). For example, if this slope rises 
as N declines, any given increase in induce- 
ment generates more additional services than 
it would have when practice sizes were 
larger, enhancing the desirability of induce- 
ment. For physicians whose UI < 0, there is a 
further effect of a change in this slope. If 
marginal productivity of inducement rises, a 
given amount of extra dollars can be gener- 
ated with less extra inducement and, hence, 
less loss of utility. 
This illustrates the distinction between the 
effects of fee reductions and decreases in 
practice size. MP show that if the payer lowers 
the fee, inducement rises if income effects are 
strong and falls when they are weak. In com- 
parison, equation (6) demonstrates that unless 
the disutility of inducing demand is very high 
or the opportunities for inducement substan- 
tially worsen, a reduction in the number of 
patients per physician leads to more aggres- 
sive care regardless of the strength of the in- 
come eflect. This implies that neither the tar- 
get income hypothesis nor the existence of 
strong income effects is necessary to show 
that doctors respond to certain market condi- 
tions (such as the loss of patients due to rising 
managed care penetration) by providing more 
services per patient. 
Special Cases 
Income Targeting Physicians. Under the target 
income hypothesis, marginal utility of income 
is very high below the target and very low 
above it (U,, -+ - 00 as income approaches the 
target). Thus, only terms multiplied by U,, 
matter and equation (6) simplifies immensely 
to: 
(7) 
-n& I -  
N -  nX, + n$ 
To confirm that equation (7) corresponds to 
the intuition behind the target income hypoth- 
esis, consider the supply elasticity of the total 
quantity of services ( n X )  with respect to a 
change in average FFS practice size (N). This 
elasticity can be expressed as: 
" =-- 
n 
In a symmetric equilibrium, n = N (each phy- 
sician has the average practice size) and 
n N =  1 (shocks to average practice size affect 
each physician equally). Thus, the elasticity 
of services supplied by physicians following 
the TIH is -1. The physician exactly offsets 
the impact of a decline in the FFS patient to 
physician ratio as long as I < T. 
Profit Maximizing Physicians. With no in- 
come effects (U,, = 0), physicians maximize 
profits net of all costs, including the opportu- 
nity cost of time and the "cost" of inducing 
demand. Equation (6) simplifies slightly to: 
This expression will also be negative unless 
(n&, + n,&) is positive and large. Comparing 
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equations (7) and (9), inducement generally 
responds more strongly to a change in N under 
the TIH [e.g., if (n&, + nl& = 01. Profit max- 
imizing doctors attenuate, but do not elimi- 
nate, the effects of a decline in patient volume 
on their incomes. TIH physicians also experi- 
ence disutility from inducing demand, but 
their behavior is determined solely by their 
devotion to achieving their income targets. It 
is possible, but unlikely, that profit maximiz- 
ing physicians raise inducement even more 
than TIH physicians in response to a decline 
in N. This can occur if patient selection effects 
are so strong that inducement effort becomes 
much more productive as N declines. In this 
scenario, TIH physicians stop once their tar- 
gets are achieved, but profit maximizers might 
find it worthwhile to induce demand beyond 
this point. 
No Disutility of Inducing Demand. If the phy- 
sician experiences no disutility from inducing 
demand (U, = 0), equation ( 5 )  becomes: 
(10) (nX, + n J ) (  U,m - ULt) = 0 
This first order condition could be satisfied in 
two ways. If U,m - UL remains positive when 
nX, + n,J falls to zero (that is, when the quan- 
tity of services, nX, is maximized by setting 
I = r), the physician induces as much demand 
as possible. The physician would like to pro- 
vide even more services at the existing fee 
(marginal utility of income exceeds that of 
foregone leisure). Alternatively, the physician 
wil l  not maximize workload ( I < P )  if 
U,m - ULt falls to zero while nX, + nJ re- 
mains positive. In this case, the marginal util- 
ity of income generated by the last unit of 
service equals the marginal utility of foregone 
leisure and the physician does not fully ex- 
ploit her ability to induce demand. 
To assess the effects of a change in N on 
inducement, first consider the I < P case. The 
comparative static becomes: 
-[(dl + nrY)(Ux,m2n&+ ULLt2n&) 
(df, + na2( U,,m2 + ULLt2) (11) I N =  
Unlike equation (6) ,  there is no U,, term in the 
denominator and both the numerator and the 
denominator contain terms multiplied by 
(U,m - ULt), which must equal zero for the 
first order condition to hold in the /<I '  re- 
gime. Once these terms are eliminated, sev- 
eral others cancel, leaving: 
Since this expression is identical to that de- 
rived for TIH physicians (7), there is no sign 
ambiguity. Not only is the comparative static 
always negative, but the strength of response 
is independent of whether physicians attempt 
to maximize profits or attain a target income. 
Physicians attempt to fully offset declines in 
patient volume by providing more services per 
patient regardless of whether or not the target 
income hypothesis is true. 
This striking result is actually quite intu- 
itive. The physician's initial choice incorpo- 
rates her optimal income/leisure tradeoff. At 
a given fee and without disutility of inducing 
demand, the physician can remain at this op- 
timal income/leisure bundle by varying in- 
ducement as long as I < I*. Thus, the behavior 
of a non-TIH physician facing a shrinking 
practice is indistinguishable from income tar- 
geting. The physician is effectively insulated 
from competition as utility in the fee-for-ser- 
vice sector is independent of increases in man- 
aged care penetration or physician supply. 
When I < P, increases in managed care pene- 
tration will not affect the attractiveness of FFS 
medicine if physicians do not dislike perform- 
ing unnecessary services. 
If N continues to decline, the physician's 
ability to maintain income will eventually be 
threatened. This occurs regardless of whether 
the original income level arises from an ex- 
plicit target or simply from the utility maxi- 
mizing income/leisure tradeoff. Once the phy- 
sician exerts the inducement effort I*,  the abil- 
ity to offset shocks to practice size by prac- 
ticing more aggressive medicine has been ex- 
hausted. The FFS physician can do no better 
than to remain at I' despite her declining in- 
come and utility, allowing HMOs to attract 
physicians on more favorable terms and af- 
fecting physicians' incentives for specialty 
and location choice. 
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Graphical Interpretation of TIH and Profit 
Maximization Cases. We have shown that 
physicians generally respond to a decrease in 
practice size by recommending more services 
per patient. This process is illustrated in Fig- 
ure 1.  The decline in N from No to N, shifts 
down the inducementlincome curve.I0 An in- 
come targeting physician with target Yr (or a 
profit-maximizing physician with no disutility 
of inducement and an initial income of Yr) 
increases inducement from lo to I,, insulating 
income and workload from the decline in pa- 
tients per FFS physician. If N falls to N2, the 
desired income can be achieved by selecting 
inducement level I * ,  which maximizes the 
quantity of services, nX. Any further declines 
in N cannot be offset by more intensive treat- 
ment. At N3 the physician can do no better 
than to keep inducement at I*.  The first order 
condition (6) no longer holds as an equality 
as the physician is at a corner solution. Thus, 
declines in N beyond some level cause FFS 
incomes to drop even if physicians follow the 
TIH. Market forces must eventually affect in- 
comes. 
For profit maximizing physicians who dis- 
like inducement, there is no threshold below 
which FFS incomes do not fall with N (unless 
patient selection effects are so strong that in- 
ducement becomes much more productive as 
Ndeclines). The physician partially offsets the 
loss of patients by increasing service intensity 
to remaining patients. In Figure 1, a profit- 
maximizing physician with initial income 
when N = No will not raise inducement all the 
way to I, if N falls to N,. As in the TIH case, 
N eventually declines enough that the optimal 
inducement rises almost to I* and income falls 
at a more rapid rate as N declines further. That 
is, the effects of managed care on incomes 
accelerate beyond some level of HMO pene- 
tration. 
Allowing FFS Physicians to See HMO 
Patients 
While physicians employed by group or 
staff model HMOs exclusively treat HMO pa- 
10. For ease of exposition, a change in N shifts the 
curve up or down without changing its slope (n&+ 
n / d =  0). 
tients, doctors participating in other types of 
managed care plans usually serve both man- 
aged care and FFS patients. Thus, physicians 
must decide whether or not to participate in 
managed care plans and how many managed 
care patients to see. The model can be ex- 
tended to cover these decisions. Redefine 
profits as: 
(13) n = mn(l;N)X(I) + dh 
and leisure as: 
(14) L = 24 - t[n(l;N)X(l) + h ]  
The physician sees h managed care patients, 
receiving net income of d per patient. It is 
assumed that d < m (HMO patients are less lu- 
crative than FFS patients) and the quantity of 
services provided per HMO patient is normal- 
ized to one. d could be interpreted as either 
net income from a capitation payment or as a 
discounted fee-for-service rate paid by the 
HMO. Under capitation, the HMO must en- 
sure that the physician does not “disinduce” 
demand to such an extent that enrollees are 
unhappy with their care. In the discounted 
FFS interpretation, the HMO must monitor 
utilization to prevent inducement. Since the 
HMO controls access to its enrollees, i t  can 
penalize a physician for deviations. In both 
cases, the one unit of service per patient nor- 
malization can be interpreted as the outcome 
of the HMO’s monitoring of practice patterns. 
The physician’s problem is to maximize 
utility with respect to both inducement of FFS 
patients (I) and the number of HMO patients 
seen ( h ) .  Except for the definitions of profit 
and leisure given by equations (13) and (14), 
the first order condition with respect to I is 
identical to equation ( 5 ) .  The first order con- 
dition with respect to h is: 
This condition sets the marginal utility of net 
income generated by serving an additional 
HMO patient equal to the marginal utility of 
foregone leisure. Thus, equation (15) holds as 
an equality only if the physician is willing to 
treat HMO patients. 
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FIGURE 1 
n- I NO 
Starting with the no disutility of induce- 
ment case, the physician sees only the more 
lucrative, FFS patients until I= I*. If utility is 
maximized at an I < r,  the physician can at- 
tain her preferred workload without seeing 
any HMO patients. If FFS volume is maxi- 
mized (I= r), the physician must decide 
whether or not to serve HMO patients. Since 
d < m, the marginal utility of the income gen- 
erated by serving the first HMO patient might 
be less than the marginal utility of foregone 
leisure. If this occurs, the physician is at a 
“notch”: she would willingly serve another 
FFS patient, but does not find it worthwhile 
to serve any HMO patients at the discounted 
rate. Alternatively, if marginal utility of man- 
aged care income exceeds the marginal dis- 
utility of foregone leisure, the physician ac- 
cepts managed care patients until equation 
(1 5 )  is satisfied. 
Physicians who dislike inducing demand 
are more likely to see HMO patients. While 
the FFS sector offers a higher fee, the man- 
aged care incentive and monitoring structure 
reduces the financial rewards for inducing de- 
mand. If d is close enough to m, the physician 
may agree to see HMO patients before 
I=P (i.e., despite unexploited FFS induce- 
ment opportunities) because of lower mar- 
ginal inducement costs under managed care. 
At any reimbursement level, managed care 
will be more attractive to physicians the 
greater their aversion to overprescribing care. 
IV. ENDOGENZING MANAGED CARE MARKET 
PENETRATION 
To this point, we have treated changes in 
managed care penetration and the associated 
changes in the physician/population ratio in 
the fee-for-service sector, as exogenous. 
Clearly, this is a strong assumption. It is be- 
yond the scope of this paper to characterize 
an equilibrium including endogenously deter- 
mined FFS premiums, managed care premi- 
ums and managed care market share. How- 
ever, a simple, descriptive model of managed 
care market penetration reveals how changes 
in the exogenous determinants of managed 
care market share can be amplified (or damp- 
ened) by adjustments in the relative premiums 
in the two sectors. 
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Managed care market share (s) is a function 
of local patient and physician preferences for 
managed care (j), other area specific factors 
such as income, unionization, or firm size (x), 
FFS premiums relative to managed care pre- 
miums ( r ) ,  and exogenous factors that vary 
over time (k). 
(16) s = 80, x, r, k)  
Cross sectional variation in managed care 
penetration rates can largely be explained by 
variation in the x’s orj’s. Growth in managed 
care penetration over time can be related pri- 
marily to changes in k. Because this paper fo- 
cuses on how the physician labor market is 
affected by changes in managed care market 
share, we focus on k. What variables might be 
included in k? Baumgardner [ 199 I ]  suggests 
that certain types of technical change may 
lead to growth in demand for managed care. 
Other possibilities include changes in em- 
ployer practices regarding subsidization of 
employee health care costs or changes in reg- 
ulatory environment. 
Whatever the cause behind growing man- 
aged care market share, this trend should re- 
duce the patient/physician ratio in the FFS 
sector. As demonstrated earlier, a decline in 
FFS practice size would be expected to alter 
service intensity and physician incomes. 
These responses are likely to change the FFS 
premium relative to the managed care pre- 
mium, leading to a further change in managed 
care penetration. 
FFS premiums are a function of prices and 
quantities of services rendered to FFS pa- 
tients. Quantities depend on the degree to 
which physicians induce demand. We refer to 
this as the inducement effect and expect it to 
raise FFS premiums relative to managed care 
premiums. On the price side, we expect FFS 
incomes to fall in response to higher managed 
care penetration, at least after some threshold 
penetration rate is reached. This would allow 
managed care plans to secure physician ser- 
vices at a lower cost which would further raise 
the relative cost of FFS coverage. Of course, 
if greater competition for patients causes FFS 
fees to fall, at least part of this effect would 
be offset. We denote these forces as price ef- 
fects and cannot determine, a priori how they 
would impact relative premiums, though we 
anticipate they would work to the advantage 
of managed care plans able to exercise mo- 
nopsony power in physician markets. 
FFS premiums also depend on the mix of 
patients and physicians left in the FFS sector. 
Premiums are influenced by the average 
health status of enrollees, the average suscep- 
tibility of enrollees to inducement, the aver- 
age propensity of physicians to induce de- 
mand and physicians’ and patients’ prefer- 
ences for aggressiveness of care. We call these 
phenomenon selection effects. Relative FFS 
premiums would rise if certain selection ef- 
fects dominate (e.g., if managed care plans 
attract physicians who are averse to aggres- 
sive care, which could raise aggressiveness of 
care in the FFS sector even if the inducement 
patterns of individual physicians do not 
change). However, relative FFS premiums 
would fall if other selection effects dominate 
(e.g., if new managed care enrollees are sickly 
compared to prior enrollees or if those pa- 
tients most vulnerable to inducement leave the 
FFS sector). Thus, the net impact of selection 
on relative FFS premiums remains ambigu- 
Given the variety of inducement, price and 
selection effects, reasonable arguments can 
support the positions that the expansion of 
managed care will increase or decrease rela- 
tive FFS premiums. This ambiguity indicates 
that an increase in managed care penetration 
arising from a change in some exogenous fac- 
tor may be amplified or offset by changes in 
the relative FFS premiums. The degree of am- 
plification or offset is determined by the dis- 
tribution of enrollee preferences. If a portion 
of the population has a strong aversion to 
managed care, increases in relative FFS pre- 
miums spawned by increased in managed care 
penetration may not translate into sizable fur- 
ther increases in managed care penetration. 
Alternatively, if most consumers are very sen- 
sitive to premium differentials, exogenous 
changes in managed care penetration rates 
could lead to a spiral in which FFS medicine 
virtually disappears. Given the increasing pro- 
portion of employers who are requiring em- 
ployees to pay at the margin when choosing 
more expensive insurance plans, sensitivity to 
premium differences is likely to be increasing. 
Despite the uncertain net result of these 
various forces, we believe that the fundamen- 
tal conclusions of our model remain valid. 
ous. 
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Under any scenario in which the growth of 
managed care decreases the average FFS prac- 
tice size, physician incomes will come under 
increasing pressure, raising the likelihood that 
ability to induce demand becomes exhausted. 
V. DISCUSSION 
The non-linear effect of managed care pen- 
etration on physician incomes identified in the 
model has several implications for empirical 
research and policy. The apparently delayed 
response of specialty and location patterns to 
changes in the marketplace is neither surpris- 
ing nor does it imply that physicians will not 
face financial strains in the future. Physicians 
would have to possess tremendous un- 
exploited capacity to induce demand if they 
are to remain insulated from market forces. If 
half of the U.S. population were enrolled in 
HMOs, payments to FFS physicians would 
have to double maintain current income levels 
(Reinhardt [ 19941). 
Our model suggests that there can be two 
fundamentally different labor market re- 
gimes.” In a fee-for-service dominated re- 
gime, physicians partially or fully offset small 
shocks to practice size by inducing demand. 
In this regime, historical relative and absolute 
specialty incomes can largely be maintained, 
and the labor market does indeed seem dys- 
functional as physician behavior prevents the 
market from sending the “proper” signals. 
Conversely, in a managed care dominated en- 
vironment, FFS physician earnings fall in 
oversupplied specialties and locations as de- 
mand inducement opportunities are ex- 
hausted. ‘ 
The acceleration of the impact of managed 
care on FFS physician income appears robust 
to changes in the model’s assumptions. The 
I I .  Interestingly, physicians have expressed views con- 
sistent with this dual regime notion: “A sponge will absorb 
liquid without a change in the rate of absorption until very 
near capacity, at which time there is a rapid falloff and 
cessation. All the additional fluid is excess. The market for 
physician services demonstrates a similar saturation pro- 
cess” (Michael J .  Scotti, M.D., as quoted in Mitka [ 19971). 
12. Fee setting ability may have contributed to 
physicians’ ability to maintain their incomes despite rising 
competition. Using data from the 1970s (before aggressive 
price setting by third party payers), Pauly and Satterthwaite 
[ 19811 found that prices rose with the physician to popula- 
tion ratio. In the current environment, even if physicians 
retain some fee-setting ability, upward flexibility on fees 
may further erode the competitive position of FFS insur- 
ance. 
basic result that doctors’ ability to offset the 
effects of a declining patient base becomes 
exhausted after some point holds regardless 
of whether physicians act as profit maximiz- 
ing firms or follow the target income hypoth- 
esis. 
These findings highlight the difference be- 
tween empirical tests of the TIH based on fee 
changes and those based on changes in the 
patient to physician ratio. In the MP model, 
the response of quantity to a fee change pro- 
vides a clean test of the TIH vs. profit maxi- 
mization since the comparative static has op- 
posing signs under the two hypotheses. For a 
change in FFS practice size, distinguishing 
the hypotheses is more difficult. Physicians 
are expected to engage in demand creation 
under either hypothesis. Further, if doctors 
have no aversion to inducing demand, the 
magnitude as well as the sign of the change 
in inducement is independent of whether or 
not physicians follow the TIH. 
Many health workforce experts do not an- 
ticipate vigorous, market-driven changes in 
the size and composition of the physician 
workforce. These beliefs have led to a variety 
of regulatory proposals. It is ironic that inter- 
est in intervening in the physician labor mar- 
ket has been revived at a time when it  is be- 
coming likely that market pressures against 
specialization and location i n  over-served 
areas will rise dramatically. As insurers ac- 
quire responsibility for organizing and man- 
aging the delivery of health care rather than 
merely financing it, conditions will change 
substantially in input markets such as the phy- 
sician labor market. As physician earnings 
change, the desired reallocations may occur 
without policy actions. 
Various market - dr i v e n adj us t m e n t s are 
likely to occur. HMOs would have an incen- 
tive to substitute toward physician labor rela- 
tive to nurse practitioners and physician’s as- 
sistants. Further, HMOs can only expand if 
they attract patients who did not join managed 
care plans in the past. Since these patients are 
likely to be more concerned than early HMO 
enrollees with access to specialists, HMOs 
hiring more specialists than current norms 
will be better positioned to gain enrollment. 
The net result is that current staffing patterns 
cannot be extrapolated to a managed care- 
dominated market with different absolute and 
relative wages. 
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Likewise, existing and prospective physi- 
cians will respond to changing practice envi- 
ronments. Specialty and location decisions of 
new physicians are likely to be particularly 
fluid. For older physicians, lower earnings 
and distaste for the loss of autonomy associ- 
ated with managed care would encourage re- 
tirement. Other physicians would relocate to 
underserved areas, change specialties, or ac- 
cept non-clinical positions. Likewise, many 
internal medicine or pediatric subspecialists 
have appropriate training to provide primary 
care. 
Even if physicians and HMOs respond to 
changing demand conditions, the labor market 
would adjust with a lag due to fixed costs of 
changing specialties and locations. Therefore, 
some policy initiatives may still be justified.” 
Programs to encourage location in rural or low 
income areas may remain worthwhile. Unless 
health care purchasing power rises in these 
areas, the market may continue to provide 
fewer health care resources than society de- 
sires. Also, federal funding of graduate med- 
ical education rewards the creation of resi- 
dency positions, providing hospitals with a 
pool of subsidized labor. Reinhardt [ 19941 
suggests that teaching hospitals should be fi- 
nanced on a “break even” basis to eliminate 
these incentives. 
Recent anecdotal evidence is consistent 
with our model (Borzo [ 19941): 
At the end of 1992, 83% of Aetna’s enrollees 
working for small and midsize employers 
in the New York City area were covered 
by indemnity plans. By September 1993, 
84% were in managed care plans. Just  a 
year ago, insurers in New York were com- 
plaining that physicians would not join their 
managed care networks. Today, physicians- 
particularly specialists-are complaining 
that they can’t sign up because many panels 
are filled. 
The resistance of New York physicians to 
managed care may indicate that utility in the 
FFS sector was insulated from small levels of 
managed care penetration. However, as rising 
health care costs made managed care more at- 
tractive to consumers and employers, the loss 
of patients appears to have become increas- 
ingly troublesome to FFS doctors. 
Recent data are beginning to confirm anec- 
dotal reports of declining incomes in many 
specialties and a narrowing of the earnings 
gap between specialists and primary care phy- 
sicians (Simon and Born [ 19961). Likewise, 
medical students’ shift from several formerly 
desirable specialties to primary care was re- 
markably rapid. Between 1991 and 1996, the 
number of medical students applying for fam- 
ily practice residencies rose by 73% while ap- 
plications in anesthesiology and diagnostic ra- 
diology fell by 82% and 33%, respectively 
(National Resident Matching Program [ 199 1- 
19961). If such forces continue to operate on 
a system-wide basis, the desired changes in 
the physician labor market will arise without 
government intervention. Tracking the effects 
of managed care on the physician labor mar- 
ket is an important area for future research. 
The possibility that these effects become 
stronger as managed care penetration rises 
should be explicitly considered. 
13. Regulatory approaches, which often focus on entry 
restrictions, face analogous criticisms about delayed effects. 
Further, to the extent that such restrictions lead physicians 
to expect less competition in the future, they may even 
discourage existing physicians from changing specialties or 
locations. 
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